Introduction
From Africa's early post-colonial period onwards, a strong preference for African solutions to African conflicts has consistently been recognised in the African state system. 2 Yet, paradoxically, African third parties have consistently and typically been referred to as ineffective in the academic literature. In the introduction to an edited volume on foreign involvement in civil wars in Africa, Smock and Gregorian argue that the US and the former colonial powers seem to have a better record of successful mediation than either the OAU or African leaders, and further claim that the "very significant role of the United States and the European states seems related to the assets, resources, and leverage available to these 1 I am grateful to Alex de Waal, Neil MacFarlane, and Sophia Dawkins for providing excellent comments on an earlier version of this article. Any errors are my own. powers." 3 In his study on African mediation in Eastern African civil conflicts, Khadiagala makes the claim that proximity to the adversaries and deeper knowledge of the conflicts does not substitute for concrete diplomatic and political tools that make for effective mediation;
and further argues that "by intervening with only limited tangible and material resources, African interveners have contributed to the widespread perception of being meddlers rather than mediators." 4 The problem with these claims about the ineffectiveness of African third parties is that the claims are based on only a few cases or anecdotal evidence. Studies in which it is claimed that non-African mediation is more effective than African mediation do not provide any systematic evidence to support this claim. This is particularly problematic since the modal outcome of international mediation efforts is failure. Since mediation is far more likely to fail than to succeed, it is likely that only looking at a few cases leads to biased conclusions.
In addition to the need of a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of African and non-African third parties, it is important to examine how the involvement of African and nonAfrican third parties in mediation combine to affect outcomes. While one would expect African mediators to limit the involvement of non-African third parties in mediation processes in Africa -because of the strong preference for African solutions to African conflicts -in practice African and non-African third parties are frequently involved in joint mediation efforts. As early as 1967, Zartman put forward an explanation for this seemingly paradox: "Many of Africa's foreign policy troubles are found in the dilemma posed by the two functions: The desire to solve problems, which often exceeds system capabilities and requires outside help, clashes with the desire to maintain the autonomy of the system." 5 In other words, African third parties sometimes have no other option than to accept non-African involvement in peace processes, because they lack the resources to successfully resolve the conflict by themselves. Zartman's observation that African third parties often lack the material resources to effectively mediate is typical for the academic literature on conflict resolution in Africa. 6 Contrary to much of the literature on peacemaking efforts in Africa, I argue that African third party involvement in peacemaking efforts is essential in order to resolve civil wars in Africa. While African third parties are indeed relatively weak in terms of the material resources they command, a crucial source of mediation success is usually overlooked when discussing the effectiveness of African third parties: third party legitimacy. This article shows that African third parties are effective in mediating civil wars in Africa because of a high degree of legitimacy flowing from the African solutions norm. This norm prescribes that mediation by African third parties in conflicts in Africa is more preferable than mediation by non-African third parties.
I further argue that third party legitimacy and third party capacity supplement each other rather than supplant. For this reason, mixed mediation efforts -in which African and non-African third parties jointly mediate -are highly effective. African and non-African third parties have complementary strengths: while African third parties generally provide mediation efforts with a high degree of third party legitimacy, non-African third parties can provide material incentives to the conflict parties in order to move them towards making peace.
I measure mediation success in this article by looking at whether a mediation effort leads to the conclusion of a peace agreement. The conclusion of a peace agreement is arguably the most common way of measuring mediation success, because it provides an objective benchmark that is clearly observable. 7 Indeed, it is relatively easy for researchers to code the conclusion of a peace agreement, since they are often made publically available when the peace talks end. Even when peace agreements are not published, they usually attract much international attention.
This article adds to the literature on both an empirical and theoretical level. Several studies have previously examined the effectiveness of different types of mediation, including whether the third parties are African or not. 8 As observed by Franke and Esmenjaud, the concepts of African ownership and Africanization have a "virtual omnipresence throughout the proliferating literature on peace and security in Africa." 9 However, the effectiveness of African and non-African third parties has not yet been explicitly compared in a large-n study. parties towards compliance, but if a mediator loses its legitimacy, material resources will rarely prove sufficient in mediating the conflict. In short, mediation by African third parties is more likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement than mediation by non-African third parties.
Furthermore, the comparative advantage of African third parties in legitimacy-based mediation and non-African third parties in capacity-based mediation supplement each other.
Hence, while I expect African third parties to outperform non-African third parties, I expect that mixed mediation efforts in which both types of third parties cooperate are the most effective type of mediation. The Naivasha peace process that led to the conclusion of the In short, I argue that African third parties outperform non-African third parties, but that the most effective type of mediation efforts are peacemaking efforts in which African and non-African third parties cooperate to make peace.
Cultural Similarly
Before testing the central argument put forward in this article, I briefly discuss alternative arguments for why African third parties may be more effective at mediating African conflicts than non-African third parties. The first relates to the influence of culture on mediation processes, the second to the issue of biased mediation, and the third to the ineffectiveness of conflicts. This greater understanding allows the mediator to more effectively resolve the conflict. While it is acknowledged that African third parties are more likely to be similar to African conflict parties in terms of language, religion, and race than non-African third parties, making it necessary to control for these variables in the empirical analyses, a high degree of cultural variation nevertheless exist in Africa, both between countries and within countries.
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I therefore argue that culture similarities alone cannot explain why African third parties are more effective than non-African third parties.
Biased Mediation
Since conflicts in Africa have strong regional dimensions, it is reasonable to surmise that African third parties are more likely to be biased when mediating in civil wars in Africa.
African states have frequently openly supported incumbent governments or provided covert support to rebel parties prior or simultaneously to their mediation attempt. There is a substantial literature in which it is argued that biased mediation is more effective than unbiased mediation. 34 Following these studies in favour of biased mediation, the higher likelihood of African third parties of being biased might, in turn, be the reason why African third parties are more effective than non-African third parties.
However, I argue that biased African third parties are ineffective. Biased African third parties are less likely to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, which significantly undermines the prospects for African mediation success. In the statiscal analysis, I will empirically assess to what extent biased mediation influences African mediation.
Mediation by the UN and Major Powers
The ineffectiveness of the UN when it comes to mediation has been highlighted frequently in previous studies. For instance, Touval has argued that the UN lacks the economic and military resources to successfully mediate. 35 However, the UN commands greater resources than any organisation in Africa. 36 Moreover, there are few states or organisations that have a greater capacity to deploy a peacekeeping force than the UN. Accordingly, the ineffectiveness of the UN is best explained through its lack of legitimacy as a result of the African solutions norm, as well as its relatively lack of financial and military resources compared to major powers.
Indeed, several studies have shown that major powers are effective mediators. When explaining the effectiveness of these states, particularly of the US and the Soviet Union, observers usually point to their high degree of third party capacity. For example, Touval primarily refers to the "vast military and economic resources" of the superpowers.
37
According to Rothchild, successful conflict resolution becomes more likely when great powers press the disputants to reach a compromise. 38 In line with the capacity-based mediation perspective, I argue that among the non-African third parties, the major powers are the most effective in mediating civil wars in Africa. In addition, I argue that while the UN is by an large infective at mediating civil wars in Africa, the ineffectiveness of non-African third parties is not solely driven by non-African third parties. The next section outlines the research methodology to examine test the central argument, as well as the alternative arguments.
Methodology
To statistically study the likelihood of the conclusion of peace agreements, this article draws on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 39 The unit of analysis in the African and one non-African third party were involved in the mediation. The focus is on the organizational identity of the mediator rather than the personal identity, meaning that when an African mediator is mandated by a non-African third party, as for example by the United Nations, the mediation effort is understood to be non-African. It is acknowledged that in some instances the personality of the mediator affects the prospects for success to a great extent, but the individual efforts of a mediator are connected to, and therefore greatly influenced by the standing, legitimacy, and leverage of the mandating agencies they represent.
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In order to assess the alternative explanations put forward in the theory section, I rely on several dummy variables. I understand a state to be a major power if they are defined as such in the Correlates of War project. 43 To code whether an African third party is biased, I Mediation success is assessed in terms of the conclusion of peace agreements. The conclusion of a peace agreement is measured as a dichotomous variable. I draw on the UCDP to code whether a peace agreement has been concluded in a given dyad-year. 46 In order to be included in the dataset, a peace agreement should address the incompatible goals of the conflict parties by settling all or part of the conflict issues. A document that solely stipulates the implementation of a ceasefire is thus not considered to be a peace agreement.
Although this study assumes that mediation is a general phenomenon with many similarities from setting to setting, it is acknowledged that there are always contextual circumstances specific to any individual effort. In order to control for the factors that influence both the likelihood of mediation and the prospects for mediation success, several contextual factors are included in the analysis. First of all, I include a dummy variable taken from the UCDP that measures whether the conflict is fought over a piece of territory, because previous research shows that these type of conflicts are harder to resolve. 47 Since previous research shows that civil war episodes in which many battle-related deaths occur are less likely to be resolved, the models also include a dummy variable that measures the intensity of the conflict. Conflict intensity is measured by coding conflict dyad years in which more than 1,000 battle-related deaths are recorded as 1. 48 In order to control for the impact of the duration of the conflict, a variable is include that measures the number of years. A squared version of conflict duration is also included to control for curvilinear effects. 49 Since previous research has found that peace agreements are more likely to be concluded in conflicts with stronger rebel parties, a variable is included that measures the strength of the rebel movement in comparison to the government. 50 Finally, I also include a control variable in the models that is coded as 1 when the conflict parties receive financial support, military equipment, or are allowed to use safe havens in another country.
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In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity in the explanatory variables, the dummy variable measuring no mediation is excluded from the analyses in each of the models. No mediation thus serves as the reference category by which the coefficients of the different mediation types are interpreted. This means that if a variable measuring mediation has a statistically insignificant effect, then this type of mediation is not statistically significant more or less likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement that when no mediation takes place in a given conflict dyad-year.
Finally, the data used in this study entail observations on the same unit of analysis over a series of time points, which may bias the findings as a result of temporal dependence. 
<< Insert table 1 here >>
Model 1 in Table 1 shows the results for the comparison between the effectiveness of the different types of third parties. All three types of mediation have a positive impact, though the effect of non-African mediation is statistically insignificant. Since the reference category is conflict dyad-years with no mediation, it follows from Model 1 in Table 1 that dyad-years in which African and mixed mediation take place are significantly more likely to experience the conclusion of a peace agreement. By contrast, conflict dyad-years in which non-African mediation takes place are not statistically significant more or less likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement than dyad-year in which no mediation takes place.
The difference between the coefficients of each type of mediation reported in Model 1
in Table 1 are substantial. Based on the logit estimates of Model 1 in Table 1, Table 2 shows that when all variables are held at mean value, the probability of the conflict parties concluding a peace agreement in a given conflict-dyad-year is only 2.0 percent. All else equal, the probability of the conclusion of a peace agreement increases by 1356 percent when an African third-party is involved in mediation. For non-African mediation this probability increases by only 100 percent and for mixed mediation this is 1138 percent. Hence, African mediation is much more likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement than nonAfrican mediation.
<< Insert table 2 here >>
As a robustness test, the observations in Model 2 in Table 1 are restricted to conflict dyad-years which experienced mediation. When restricting the observations to this sub-set of cases, the finding that African and mixed mediation efforts are more effective than nonAfrican mediation efforts still holds.
Model 3 includes a dummy variable that measures whether the chief mediator shares a similar culture with one or both of the conflict parties. A chief mediator that shares a similar ethnicity, religion, and language with at least one of the conflict parties is relatively rare. According to Anthony Nyakyi, the former Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral to Liberia, this lack of neutrality was the main obstacle to peace, as it made Charles
Taylor hesitant to become involved in peace talks led by ECOWAS.
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In line with the capacity-based perspective of mediation success, Model 5 in Table 1 shows that major power mediation is a type of non-African mediation that has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a peace agreement is concluded.
Mediation by the UN has a negative impact, but this effect is insignificant. The mediation efforts of the Soviet Union and the US in the civil war between the Government of Angola and UNITA illustrate how the economic and military power of superpowers can lead to the conclusion of peace agreements. The MPLA government had paid for the Soviet Union's military support by oil and diamonds revenues, but Angola still had a total external debt of close to $9 billion by 1991, of which 65 percent owed to the Soviet Union. 56 This gave the Soviet Union leverage over the MPLA government. The UNITA leadership was also provided with incentives to comply with the mediator, particularly through the involvement of the US, which was the main provider of military support to UNITA. Commenting on the conclusion of the Bicesse Accords, UNITA leader Savimbi expressed that without the Americans and the Soviets the mediation process would not have gotten anywhere.
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It follows from Table 1 that just like African mediation, mixed mediation also significantly increase the prospect for conflict resolution. 
<< Insert table 3 here >>
A further distinction is made between coordinated mixed mediation led by an African third party and those that are led by a non-African third party. Although several third parties can be involved in a mediation process, there is usually one third party that takes the lead.
Often this is the country or organization to which the chief mediator belongs. Those coordinated mixed mediation efforts which were conducted jointly are also considered. The It follows from Table 3 that uncoordinated mediation has a negative, though statistically insignificant, impact on mediation success. Since conflict dyad-years in which no mediation takes place is the reference category of the mediation types under study, it follows from Table 3 that a peace agreement is not statistically significant more or less likely to be concluded in a conflict dyad-year in which uncoordinated mixed mediation takes place than in a conflict dyad-year in which no mediation takes place. By contrast, if coordinated mediation takes place in a given conflict-dyad year, the conclusion of a peace agreement is much more likely than if no mediation would take place in this dyad-year. The lack of coordination between Portugal, France, and ECOWAS in their peacemaking efforts in the civil war in Guinea-Bissau between 1998 and 1999 illustrate how competing interests can undermine the potential effectiveness of mixed mediation. 59 The mediation effort conducted by the Community of Sant'Egidio between the CNDD-FDD leadership and the Government of Burundi in Rome in September 1996 serves as another example of uncoordinated mixed mediation. The negotiations mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio were not intended to complement the regional initiative, rather to substitute it. 60 By contrast, all three types of coordinated mediation have a positive and significant effect. Yet, Table 4 below shows that coordinated mixed mediation that is led by an African third party is by far the most effective, making the conclusion of a peace agreement 1766 percent more likely than when no mediation takes place. The finding that African led mixed mediation has been found to be the most effective type of mediation resonates with the peace and security polices developed as part of the partnership for peace.
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<< Insert table 4 here >>
The final phase of the Abuja peace process, which was aimed at ending the civil war in Darfur, illustrates that non-African third parties taking over the mediation process can supplant the positive impact of African mediation. While the AU mediators had made some progress towards resolving the underlying conflict issues, an externally imposed deadline and an intrusive mediation strategy pursued by the US terminated the peace process prematurely.
Instead of building on the work already done by the AU, the US and the UK relied on a strategy based on coercion and inducements to move the conflict parties towards compromise. Hence, the final days of the Abuja talks to end the war in Darfur show the importance that African third parties maintain the lead when mediating civil wars in Africa.
Conclusion
The statistical analyses suggest that African third parties outperform non-African third parties in terms of concluding peace agreements. In 2011, the AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping pointed out that: "Lasting peace on the continent can only be achieved if efforts to that end are based on the full involvement of Africa and a recognition of its leadership role because, as stressed by the Summit in August 2009, without such a role, there will be no ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better; because we know which solutions will work, and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours, and our peoples will live with their consequences." 62 The statistical analyses employed in this article supports this statement. African third parties are generally more effective in resolving civil wars in Africa than non-African third parties.
However, a major caveat regarding the finding that African third parties outperform non-African third parties is that that the involvement of a biased African third party in mediation processes has a negative and statistically significant effect on mediation success.
Since conflicts in Africa have strong regional dimensions, African states have frequently openly supported incumbent governments or have provided covert support to rebel parties prior or simultaneously to their mediation attempt. The statistical analysis employed in this article suggests that the involvement of biased African third parties that are supporting or have supported one of the conflict parties undermines the prospects for mediation success.
In terms of theory development, the findings in this article suggest that ideational factors influence the effectiveness of a third party. A capacity-based perspective of mediation success cannot adequately explain why African third parties, which often face resource constraints, are more effective in mediating civil wars in Africa than non-African third parties. Future research should be devoted to examining why and how third party legitimacy matters. Regime," 44.
